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Cooperation With Past Evil and Use of 
Cell-Lines Derived From Aborted Fetuses 
by 
Alexander R. Pruss, Ph.D. 
The (Iml/or is Ass/swill Professor ill rhe Deparlmellf of Philosophy at 
GeO/gewlV1I Ullh 'ersir,r. He holds a Ph. D. ill Philosophy from tlJe 
Unin'rsity oj Pillsbllrglt ill (lddirioll to 1I Ph D. ill Mallu:IIlQlic:s from rhe 
Ullin'nit)' of BritiSh CollIlI/bia. 
I. Introd ucti on 
The production o f a number o f vaccines invol ves the use o f ce ll -lines 
originall y derived from fe tuses directl y aborted in the 1 960s and 1 970s. 
Such cell- lines . indeed sometimes the vcry salTle ones. are import<Jnl to on-
goi ng research. including at e mholic insti tuti ons. The ce lls clIITcntly used 
are removed by a number of decades and by a s ignifi cant num ber of 
ce llul ar generations frolll the o ri gina l ce ll s. Moreover. the orig inal cell s 
extracted from the bod ies of the abo rted fetu ses were transformed to 
produce the ce ll lines. since otherwise they would be incapabl e of the ki nd 
of culturing that is required. 
It is generally acknowledged by ethicists, including lTlany Catholic 
ones ge ne rally conside red to be orthodox. and by the U.S. bi shops, that the 
use of the ce ll - lines in con nection with the production of vacc ines is 
mora ll y permi ss ible. It does no t appear thtl! the re is a relevant qua litati ve 
d iffe rence bet ween the use of the ce ll -li nes in vacc ines and in researc h. 
One might argue that there is certainty of benefit from a vaccine while the 
bene fit s of research are uncertain. However, in any given case of the 
admini strati on of a vacc ine to an indi vidual. it is fa r from certai n that such 
adm ini stral ion will be of bene fit to that individual . A fter all. the indi vidual 
mi ght never come in contact with someone infected with the d isease in 
questi on, p<u1icu larly if the di sease is now uncommon in the ind ividual's 
loca te . Yet. it is morall y certain that sOllie of the admini strations of the 
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vaccine will be bene fic ial. Thi s is paralle l to the fact thai whil e any one 
research project might no t be benefi cial. the histo ry of biomedical research 
makes it ex tremely probable. indeed morall y cellain. th at sume project 
involvi ng the use of such cel l-lines will be benefic ial. There may, of 
course . be quantitati ve difference be tween the cases-the probabilities and 
benefit s may not be equal- but the di fference does not see m to be a 
qualitati ve one. Therefore . if one accepts the use of the cell -lines in 
vacc ines. one should accepttbe use in research in at least some conceivable 
and perhaps actual c ircumstances. 
The main argument I am in terested in. in favor of the use of the cel l-
lines, proceeds by first granting thai the initial abortion and ex traction of 
cell s from the deceased fetus was morally gravely iJl ic il. However, the 
connection between the currently used de ri ved cell s and the abollion and 
orig inal deri vation is suffic ientl y remote that the use becomes licit. Not all 
fruit of a poisoned tree is poisoned: il can be mora lly acceptable to profit 
from a remote evil act. The currently used cell s are temporall y and 
gene rationall y far re moved from the origi nally extracted cells. Moreover. 
they are ontologicall y removed by the initi allransfonll3tion which rendered 
them ca pable of the unlimited g rowt h needed for culturing. FUt1hemlOre. 
at least in the case of some of the research projects, though perhaps not in 
the case of some of the vaccine projects, ne ither the individuals nor the 
companies involved in the init ial illicit ac t profit economicall y from the 
continuation of the research. Those maki ng use of the ce ll- lines may be 
qu ite unaware of the ir o rig in. o r may have bee n unaware at lhe beginning 
of the use thereof. and hence cannot be said to be lac itly or overtly 
approving the illicit source . Finall y. it can be argued that as a mattcr of fact 
the continued use of these ce ll-lines . unlike perhaps in the case of stem-cell 
lines. does not increase the market demand for new cell -lines, and 
the refore the use of such cell-lines does nO! encourage further illic it acts. 
The arguments in favor of the use of these ce ll- lines are powerful and 
I believe largely convincing. Bul nonethe less. those who have a strong 
belie f in the illi citness of the initi al abollion and cell-line derivation. feel a 
discomfort with the use of the lines. even if they are convinced by the 
arg ument s. For instance. Dr. Edmund Pe llegrino. in conversati on. talked 
about the need for liS to sometimes gel our ""hands dirty". Yet it appears 
that if the argument s are sound, the hands of the researcher need not get at 
all dilly: the researcher is do ing something mora ll y quite unobjectionable. 
it appears. Any di scomfoll. thus, appears to be mistake n and irrat ional, a 
confusion between an arguabl y ralional disapproval of the initi al illic it acts 
of abor!ion or derivation and an irrat ional di staste for the use of bio logical 
material ultimately produced by these acts. 
h is thi s di scomfoll that I wi sh 10 analyze in thi s paper. I will argue 
that there is indeed a rational source for the di scomfo l1 . Now, there are two 















rad ica l positions one can hold v is~a~v i s the use of cc ll ~ lincs as described. 
First. one might think that such use is intrinsically wrong, and hence 
cannot be tolerated no maner the benefit s or distance from the origi nal 
illic it activity. This is the "radicall y restri ctive" posi tion . Second. one 
might think that given the di stance from the initial deri vation. current use 
of the ce l l~lines is permissible for ally beneficial purpose. no matter how 
small. providing that such use does not lead to other bad results. This is the 
"radically permissive" posi tion. Obviously. anyone who holds that the 
init ial abOil ion and deri valion were morally licit wi ll take the radica lly 
permissive posit ion. but it appears Ihal by the above arguments I!lleryolle 
shou ld take thi s position. And indeed there arc Catholic ethicists 
convinced of the grave wrongfulness of the initia l acts who take the 
radically permissive position. The qualifier that the use does nOl lead to 
OI her bad result s is there in part because these ethicists may, however, think 
that knowing about some uses of the cell ~lines may cause a third PUllY 
unjusl" ifiab ly to come 10 the mistaken beli ef that. say. abortion is morally 
pennissible. 
I wi ll argue. however. that both of the ex treme positions are 
mistaken. The ri ght position is that one may use the ce ll ~ lines for 
slIfficiell1ly beneficial purposes but not for other purposes. I will argue for 
thi s clai m without making use of the "scandal" ' argument that the use of the 
ceJ[ ~ l ines may cause people to come to mistaken beliefs about . say, the 
morality of abonion or 10 be encouraged to commit other illicit acts. 
Nei ther am I interested in arguments [hat such use of cell ~lines may create 
a demand for more cell ~lines in the fu ture. My lack of interest in these 
arguments is purely analyti c: these arguments may indeed be sound for all 
J know. in whi ch case a more restrictive position is appropriate. What J 
would like to examine. however. is what we can say solely on the basis of 
the facts about cooperation wit h past ev il. 
Moreover. while there are very important biocthical issues at stake in 
the concrete issue of cell ~ lines , what interests me most is not the actual 
case but the general issue of cooperation with past ev il. It is by ana lyzing 
cooperation with evi l that I shall arri ve at my '" moderate'" position. 
Moreover. surprisingly. this analysis may throw li ght on what pril1ltl j(u:ie 
seems a completely different bUl no less thorny issue: the problem of the 
juslification o f retributive punishment. 
2. The Radically Restrictive Position 
I take it for granted . both for the pu rposes of the arg ument and ill 
persolla propria. that intentional abortion is a morall y illi ci t act of killing a 
juridically in nocent human person. Moreover. one can argue that extrJcting 
ti ssue or organs from the body of a dead person is only peml issible with the 
November. 2004 337 
permission of that person or of a responsible proxy-thi s is because 
appropri ate respect for the bodies of deceased persons is called fo r. An 
aborted fe tus does not give implic it or ex plicit permi ssion for such 
extraction. On the contrary. one might argue th<.lt one can always presume 
non-coopemlion between the non-willing victim of an illic it killing and the 
person invo lved in the killing. If so, then even without considering the 
question of proxies. we mi ght arg.ue that no one complic it in the killing 
would be permitted 10 ex tract the tissue. 
And. in any case. no one compli cit with the abortion COUllts as a 
" responsible proxy' · if aborti on is an illicit killing of a human person . For 
instance. our socie[y ri ghtl y takes a parent 10 lose his o r her parental ri ghts 
a fter intenti onally attempting to innict grave harm on a c hi ld. Since 
abortion is such a grave harm, those parent s complic it in the aboltion 
cannot count as responsible parties. and hence their permission for the use 
of ti ssue or o rgans would be irrelevant. Furthermore. there does not appear 
to be any olher responsible party around to authori ze stich extraction. The 
two exceptions would be a case where either the mother is coerced into 
undergoing tbe abortion and conse nts 10 the use of the ti ssue or organs. and 
a case where the father disapproves of the abOlti on and consents to the 
ti ssue or organ extrac tion. Nonethe less, I am not aware of any ev idence 
Ihat any of the cell-lines generall y under di scussion originate in one of 
these two exceptiona l circumstances . Thus. it seems. the initial ex traction 
W"IS wrong. Moreover. thi s extraction was almost surely June in d use 
coopera tion with the person performing the abortion. and that gives further 
reason to think it wrong. and indeed seri ously so. 
Bu t it does nOI fol low from the fact that something is the product o f a 
gravely illicit action that we arc not pcrmincd to make good use of it. One 
can lic itl y li ve in a building o ri g inall y built by slave labor. If an ethni c 
g roup were entire ly wiped oul through genoc ide. there wou ld be no moral 
impenlti ve to keep their land vacant unti l the end of hislo ry. A policeman 
on ly makes a li ving because of the immoral actions of c riminals. 
Now. one mi ght make a specific argument that in the case at hand. 
the use of the cell-li nes is illicit. For instance. if one believes that the end 
result of the deri vat ion process is s\ill a part of the body of the deceased 
fetu s. then one may think that the argument that prohibited the derivation 
continues to prohibit the use of the cell -lines. However. sLlch reasoning 
would be incorrect. First. as has been pointed oul by Kev in Fitzgerald.1 the 
ce lls have bee n biologically transformed after the ex tracti on. and we do not 
consider tumor-ce ll s. being simi lurly transfonned. to be a part of the body 
of the individual. Second, if an o rgan is transplanted from one person to 
anot her. new ce ll s grown from the organ in lhe body o f the recipient are 
surely no longer lhe donor's cells. 






The on ly other argumelll that comes 10 mind he re is that etlch human 
be ing hus some -"pecial righ!. perhaps ak in to "copyright" or "patent right". 
to hi s genet ic t'ode. And indeed laws to that effect have been passed in 
some locales and there are soc ietal allitudes thai mi ghl make Ih is 
somewhat plausible. Thus. many people would object to the research use 
of DNA ex t rac t~d wit holltthe pe rson's permission from items that are no 
longe r a part o f person's body and indeed that no longer are even the 
person's properly. suc h as hair clippings le ft behind in the hair-dresser's 
shop. The one excepti on they might make would be in the case of DNA 
thought to possibly o rigi nate from a guilt y party. such as DNA extracted 
from items left at a crime scene . I must confess thm I do not have a 
cOl1vinc ing res ponse to thi s argume nt apm1 from the aUlobi ographica l 
statement that it has li llie traction un me. I see no reason why I should have 
ow nership ove r the info rmation contained in my DNA. if thi s is 
information that ne ither was crc~lIed by me nor was created by someone 
ebe who has ceded title to me. tvly parents did not create my DNA in the 
way that an arti st cremes a painti ng: the process involved apparent 
randomni;'~s. The on ly candidate for ,I creator of the D NA is God. and I 
have no ev idence that God has ceded ow nership over thi s info nnation to 
the individual s in whom it is embodied. or. for lhat mailer. that God 
prohibits the lise ofll1 is information . 
3. T he Poisoned Trcc 
3.1. Formal alltl mllterial cooperatiun with evil 
Traditiona ll y. cooperation with ev il is di vided into the formal and the 
material. ~ You formally cooperatc in someonc's illic it action provided the 
ach ieving of the same illic it object of activ ity is a pan of your action plan . 
Here. I <1m ass uming that agents have action plans that s ti pulate bOlh final 
goal and inte rmed iate sub-goal. each of which I call an ··object". and each 
of the goa l» is something intended. e ither as an end or as a means. An 
action is said to be "intri nsically wrong" provided so me object of it-say. 
someonc's bcing humi liated (as opposed to humbled. whi ch wou ld be a 
good thing)-is such that it is always wrong to intend it. O ne formall y 
rooperates with an illic it action if and onl y if one cooperates in such a way 
that one inte nds to achi eve that object which is ill icit. Any o ther kind of 
cooperati on is materia l. It anal yt ica lly fo llows from the above thai formal 
cooperation in an in trinsicall y wrong action is intrinsicall y wrong. since it 
involves intendin g a goal the intending of whic h is intrinsicall y wrong. 
Cooperati on in ev il can be unde rslOod in many ways. We can 
understand it as helping the agent achi eve hi s illi cit goal. or we can 
understand it as being "an accessory a fter the. fac('. say. by prai sin g the 
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agent or by helping the agent avoid the just consequences of the acti oll. 
E:.Ich of these can bt~ formal or m.Heria l: on the formal side we call praise 
the agetll in such <'1 way as to ex press our standing behind hi s illi cit 
intention. or on the material we can praise the agent in a more general way. 
fo r instance by saying: " I respect your character:' Finally. we are onl y 
interested in cases o j" COI/SciOl IJ cooperat ion: if I leave a broom outside my 
door for fi ve minutes and you use it to break a window. typicall y I will not 
have cooperated in any morally interesting way. 
Now we have a fairl y c lear handle all what merely mate ri al 
cooperation before the agent's action is like: il is engag ing in acti vity thai I 
know helps the agent do hi s nefarious deed:,;. even though I do not intend to 
help hi m do Ihe nefarious deeds q 1la nefarious. Thus. if 1 own a cutlery 
store and know that some tiny percentage of customers will use the kni ves 
for immoral vio lent purposes. I am materially cooperating with ev il. But 
as thi s example shows. material cooperation need not be wrong. However. 
obse.rve that there is a presllmptioll against sllch cooperation . One needs a 
suffic ientl y se rious reason to engage in it. If the only licit use kni ves had 
was something com plete ly trivial. I would not be justified in such 
cooperation with ev il. But there are many important morally 1ic itll ses of 
kni ves, and so I amj uslit"i ed. 
Material cooperation after the fact is a much more hazy affair. 
Helping a c riminal escape may count as such. Ag<lin. note that such 
cooperati on can be lic it. For instance. if a child has stolen a cand y bar in a 
state that punishes every theft with death . I would be justified in he lping 
the "hild escape punishment. (Note that the alternati ve of imposing 
punishment myself would not be ava ilable if I wasn' t authorized by the 
child 's parents .) The cooperation would be merely materia l unless thereby 
I ex pressed my sharing in the child 's ill icit int ention. Nonetheless. there 
would be a presumpt ion against such cooperation. One would need to have. 
a suffic ientl y serious reason for it. 
3.1. Profitillg from evil 
Almost everything I said so far is well -known materia l. But it is now 
that things get interesting. The question before us is whether plVfirillg 
from the effects of an evil act counts as cooperation with evil after the facL 
I shall assume that the profiting does not constitute ./imnai cooperation. 
The cooperation is not a p<U1 of a plan of action of one 's own that includes 
the same intended ill icit goa l as the evildoer had. 
Consider five cases of profiting from evil : 
THE VIOLINIST - You are a world-famous violinist and need U new kidney 
to survive. One of your fans. without consulting you. 
kills Jones. whom he knows to be a good genetic mUlch 
for you and to have signed an organ donor card . The 





murderer is caug ht. The hospital nnds {11m Jo nes's 
kidneys match you and o nl y you. No o ne bu t yo u wo ul d 
bene nt from Jo nes's kidney and so you accept the 
kidney. 
T HE POLICEMAN- YOLI became a poli ce man in order to make mo ney fo r 
yo ur family. Yo u would not make eno ug h mo ney for 
your famil y were there no crime . s ince as it happens 
be ing a po lice man is the o nly job yo u would be nb le to 
gel. 
TIlI~ ToUR IST- Yo u walk on pavement in Ro me . u ri gi na ll y built by 
s laves.3 It wo uld be less comfo rtable to wa lk o n bare 
earth . and so you p rofit from the fact that anc ient 
Ro mans fo rced people into slavery. 
T HE HlsmRIAN - Using hi storical records. you reconstruc t the dynamics 
or pri sone r-guard interacti on at A uschwitz, and o n that 
basi s you co me Lip with a new soc iolog ica l theory that 
explains many things. and has applicatio n to making o ur 
soc iety a beller o ne. 
T HE TYPHUS RESEARCHER - You di scover that so me of the gravely immoral 
ty phus experiments do ne at Auschwitz produced data 
that is sc ientificall y valuable. Yo u use thi s daw in yuur 
own research. buildi ng o n it. 
think that in eac h of these fi ve cases. the acti o ns described (lrc 
de fensib le . Nonethe less. I beli eve that there arc s ig nifi cant diffe re nces 
between the cases. I be lieve th at the cases of T HE VIOLI NIST and T HE 
TYPH US RESEARCHER trouble us most. The case of THE TOURIST may tro uble 
us: we may ;.lIld I believe sho uld fee l H discomfo rt walking o n the pav ing 
sto nes and thin king of the b lood of the s laves ki lled while building Rome. 
But I think that ne ilhe r T ilE POLICEMAN nor TilE HISTORI AN needs to troubl e 
us at all. You may not share the se intu itions. but they appear quite 
pl ausible to me. I hope you will find these intuitio ns even more plausible 
when I fini sh. 
Now. we co uld say that the di sco mfort fe lt abOllt the cases of T HE 
VIOLINIST. T HE T YPHUS RESEA RCHER and THE TOURIST is s imply due to 
confusio n. The people fee ling the di scomfort have no t bee n ab le to 
inte rnalize Ihe fact that clearly by accepting the o rgan. using the data lind 
Ireading o n the paveme nt they are nOl in any Wlly co ntributi ng causally to 
the bad things do ne o r express ing approval fo r the m. Or perhaps 
transference is at fault : we transfe r the mo ra l di sapproval of the bu ilding o f 
the pavement onto our walking on that pavement . albe it in attenuated fo nn. 
But the ide a that the d iscomfort is confused is not plausible . 1 be lieve . 
Arguments that imply lhal il is confu sed are mi ss in g an important moral 
dime nsio n Ihat reall y is the re. 
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I thi nk it is fairly clear that the Ari stolclian prudent age nl l1'ollld fee l 
di scomfon aboul THE VIOLINIST. TH E T YPH US R ESEARCII ER and TH E. T OURIST. 
But not about TH E P OLlCE."AN and THE H ISl'OR1AN. Yet all li ve cases are 
cases of proliling from ev il act ions in the past. Obse rve. too. that the 
di stance that the evil aClions are removed from Ihe present is not what 
makes fo r the difference between the problematic <l nd unproblematic 
cases. After all. the pol iceman and tbe violini st both deal with very reccnt 
ev ils. wh ile our historian and typhus rese:lfcher both prolit from an ev il 
that is equal ly far back. And the paving stones arc much older than the 
crimes the policeman solves Of the structure. of institu tionali zed evi l that 
the hi storian studies. 
R:uh er. the differe,nce. I submit. is that o ur violini st. touri st and 
typhus researcher all pro lit from ev il in morc or less th e way that the 
malefaclOr intended for Ihe ev il to be proli led from. T he viol inis( 5 fan 
kill ed Jones in ord er for tbe violini st to ha ve Jones' kid ney. The 
"owners" of tb e slaves intended to build a pavement lhat people could 
walk , maybe even hop ing it would be part of the appea l of an "eternal" 
c it y. It is plaUSible lhat the Nazi doctors did re search on typhus in part 
to promole the sc ientific und erstanding of th e di sease (a nd in pa rt to 
fu rther the war effort on the Easte rn Front ). BlII th e c rim ina l rare ly 
commit s c rimes in order 10 encourage li S 10 employ po li cemen. and 
Rudolf Hoss ce rtainl y d id not se rve as the commandant at Ausdnv it z in 
order to provide hi storians wi th a case stud y of a radi ca ll y unjust 
society. I think thi s difference is s ignili cant. And I hope to soon show 
why. 
3.3. Frustrating c\'ildocrs 
There is a part icular salisfaction people get from see ing ev il 
pun ished and an indignation al seeing the wicked prosper. Traditionall y. 
the problem of ev il included bolll the suffer ings of the innoce nt lIlId the 
apparent good fortune of the wicked. The latter is no longer fe lt to be as 
problemati c nowad:Jys-such a concern is felt to be 100 "vengeful ". ~ 
Nietzsche offered us the idea tbat the sat i sf~lc tion we got from see ing ! 
people suffer was what made sense of retri bu tive punishment: Fred has 
hurt Bob and since Fred cannOt undo Bob 's pain he repays Bob by giving 
him the joy o f seeing Fred suffer. Nietz sche is wrong. I think. If he were 
righl.then soc iety w(luld suffi ciently dojustice by lying to Bob that Fred is 
sufferi ng. and surely that is not suffic ient for justice. 
I think there is somethillg right about the feeling Ihat it is appropriate 
tbat the wicked should be punished. that they should suffe r. not j ust pOllr 
ellcourager It's (III/res. but Ihal justice might be done. It is a feel ing too 
deeply ti ed to our noti ons of justice to go away. The main argument 
342 Linacre Quanerly 
.~ 
~ 
against this is just that the idea is too venge ful for it to be appropriate for 
us. thaI there can be no rat ional justifi cati on for it. I will argue that there is 
a ralional justification that has a surpri sing connection with our attitudes 
towmds profi ting from evil. though I am aware that my story does not 
exhaust what is to be said about retributi ve punishmcnl- I know that there 
are cases where the story is insuffic ienLJ As a ge neral methodolog ical 
point. when we have a deep-seated affecti ve ethi cal intuition. one not 
obviously rooled in a vice bw connected with a vinue (in th is case. that of 
justi ce). the re is a presumption in favor of a project of justifying rather than 
ex plaini ng away th is intui tion. 
Observe that it is not just lIlI)" suffe ring of the wicked. or just any 
suffe ring that is causally connected with the crime. that gives the most 
satisfaction. We wa nt an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. but not a 
tooth fo r an eye or an eye for a tooth . This need not be judicially im posed 
for us to be satisfied. If the fan goes deaf short ly after killing Jones in 
order to save the violinist's li fe and therefore can neve r heM the violinist's 
music for the sake of whi ch he killed Jones. we consider this "poetic 
justice:' If the plantati on goes broke whil e the slaves are employed. we 
find th is deepl y appropriate. though we sympath ize wi th the slaves who 
will bear the brunt of lhi s failure. 
If Nietzsche were right. it would be the greatest possible degree of 
suffe ring in the ev ildoer that would satisfy Ollr instinct for justice. But. 
rather. it is the greal"eSl poss ible approp /"/atelless of the malefactor'S 
suffe ring that sati sli es us . And it appears that we take it to be very 
appropri ate when the malefactor suffers by being deprived of precisely that 
which he sought to achi eve: The fan who wanted to li sten to more music 
and com milled murder who goes deaf and the exploiter who loses money. 
Obse rve. interestingly, that we find the second case rather sat isfying even 
though the suffe rings of the slave "owner"' through bankruptcy are 
incomparably small er than those that he had imposed on the slaves. We 
Illay fcel that j ustice demands more suffering from the master. but the 
appropriateness of the suffe ring imposed is indi sputable. This. [ think . is 
suffic ient to show lhat our nolion o f "poeti c j uslice" is not just 
ve ngefulness. Appropriate re tributi ve just ice does see lll to restore the 
order of the un iverse. 
If 1 am right. lhen one rati ona le for retri butive justice is that it 
j l"llslrlIres the intentions of the malefactor. She wanted money: she ge ts 
bankruptcy. He wanted music: he never hears any anymore. This is true 
even when the frustrated intentions of the malefactor are good ones. After 
all. it is good that a person enjoys music. and the more people enjoy music 
the beller it is. in so far as thi s goes. Conversely. we are indignant when an 
evildoer achi eves that goal whi ch he di d the illic it acti on for-the 
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professor who becomes famous because of a paper plagia ri zed from an 
obscure third-worl d journaL the fan who ki lls to be ab le to hear the 
violin ist 's music and who spends the rest of his life enjoy ing the violinisl' s 
concerts, the slave "owner" who grows in wealth, 
Th is s uggests that it is prima jacie a good thi ng to frustrate an 
ev ildoer' s des igns, to di srupt hi s ac tion plan, and it is primajacie a bad 
thing to cooperate in the action plan th at the illi c it act ion is an integral 
instru men tal part {If. Now one can coope rate in the acti on plan lo ng 
after the illi c it action was done. by pro moti ng tha t goal whic h th e 
ma lefactor wanted promoted and promoti ng it in the way in which he 
wa nted it promoted. indeed when one's ac tion was imp li c it ly or 
exp li c itl y a part of that malefac tor's ac tion plan . This is cooperation in 
eviL and it is opposed to the prima Jacie good, a good of justice. of 
d isrupti ng the ac ti on plan. Note that it need not count as coope ration in 
evil (If all when one promotes the same goal that the malefac tor had by 
a means differelll from those the malefaclOr intended . There was no 
prima j(:lcie wrongness in acting fo r the ame.l iorat ion of the condition 
of the Ge rm an people in the aftermat h of th e First Worl d War. even 
though th is was th e same goa l Hi tler had set for himse lf. as long as one 
proceeded by causa ll y inde pendent means. Li kewise . if th ose 
philosophers and theolog ians who claim thai in some way each pe rson 
a lways seeks beati tude in every action as an ult imate end are right. il 
docs nOI fo llow th at il is wrong to help the ev ildoe r <Ichi eve 11/(/1 part of 
hi s i llici t act ion plun. but we woul d like to depart from hi s planned 
means for ac hievi ng th is, 
If this is righl. then the same ki nds of cons iderati ons that show up 
when analyzi ng our intuit ions about retributive justice are re levant to the 
question of profi ling from ev il, Plai nly, the policeman is acting to/mstrare 
the action plans of the crim inals. and the money he receives enables him to 
make a vocation of doi ng so. There is no presumption of any sort against 
th is. 
If. however, I were a temporarily unemployed fireman and a 
colleague sel fi re to a forest not to be nefi t herse lf but to benefit me. there 
would be a presumption agai nst my profiti ng from thi s, Nonetheless. the 
prima/aeie badness of cooperati ng mate ri ally in this evil wou ld be easi ly 
overridden by my need to cooperate in fi ght ing off the bad effects of my 
colleague's aClion, 
On Ihe other hand, it was part or the act ion plan of the bu ilders of 
Rome that people should enjoy the pavement. that they should ad mire the 
might of Rome. alld so on, T he tourist by doing thi s is materi ally 
compli cil. Again , thi s is a defeasible consideration. In this case. li ke in 
thai oflhe fi reman, it is a consideration defeated in a part icul arly powerful 




way by aspec ts of the siwation close ly connected with the evi ls done. 
Des pite not being justl y compensated for their labor and not be ing given a 
choice about the work, the slaves were workers. They did good work. In 
enj oy ing the fruit of their labor after many centuries, one is showing 
respect to the ir solid workmanship. Tearing up the pavement would, on the 
other hand, be disrespectful 10 these workers. 
Go back to the case of T HE TYPHUS RESEARCHER. There is. I think. a 
prill/a fac ie badness in her use of the Nazi research data, insofar as the 
research was done to further the state of science. and hence the researcher·s 
acti ons were implic itl y a part of the action plan of the Naz.i doctors. They 
intended to produce scientitic data (and by and large failed in thi s, but let 
us assume that thi s is a case where they succeeded) that wou ld be used by 
future sc ienti sts. One is playing their game by using the data. 
None theless, the cooperation is only mate rial. One is furthering some o f 
the Naz.i doctors· goals, but thi s considerati on aga inst one·s acti on is 
defe'lsible by the signifi cant medical benefit s that the data, I am supposing 
in my ticti onal case. make possible. 
Consider a variant casc . Suppose you arc a Soviet doctor and you 
hclped liberate Auschwitz. You come upon the data. You reali ze that you 
can use the data in order to strengthen the war effort against Nazi 
Germany. both by <l better understanding of the weaknesses of soldiers 
affli cted with typhus and by ameliorating the condition of All ied soldie rs at 
the front. And so you li se the data prec ise ly for thi s purpose . Here. I think. 
the re should be no di scomfort . On the contrary. the re should be a just 
sati sfaction that one is acting in a way that the malefactors did not intend 
and by doing so frustrating one of their intenti ons for the ir ev il action-
helping the German war effort. 
An age nt 's intentions may ex tend beyond hi s natural lifespan. 
Someone who gathers sc ientifi c data may do so for the sake of posterity. It 
is poss ible to promote or frustrate the goals of a person even after he is 
dead. There is prima facie reason to frustrate these goal s by not go ing 
al ong with his action plan. by not be ing a pawn in hi s game. 
Note, too, how the intuitions here go to some degree alon g with the 
intuition that temporal di stance from the agent matters. For, apart from 
megal omani acs and the trul y great (whether for good or evil). our plans 
peter out in the future. People Jllay have plans for their children and 
grandchildren and maybe greal-grandchildren. Someone might have the 
intention of producing a continuous line of descendants or of attaining 
etelllall ife through religious means. but apart from these kinds of cases the 
hori zons of our intentions is Sh0l1 . The further we are reJlloved from the 
evil deed, the less like ly that we are doing what the malefactors intended us 
to do. 
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4. The Cell-Line Research Case 
In the case of cell-line research. (he researchers illicitly extracting the 
cells probably saw themselves as ,w:ielll isl's, as people promoting future 
sc ientific research. Insofar as one is sc ientificall y bui lding on their work, 
one may well be doing exactly what they intended one to do. One is being 
a cog in their actio n plan. and hence one is cooperating materially with 
ev il. There is a presumption agai nst that: it :is a primajacie bad thi ng to do. 
assuming of course, as I do. that the initial activity was illicit. 
The Nati onal Catholic Bioethics CeJllter, when asked to comment. 
compared the research to two cases. The firs t is that of receiv ing organs 
from a murder victim. We can now sec that thi s analogy is ambiguous 
between an unproblematic case where th{: person is killed for a reason 
independen t of the organ donation, in wh ich case the mu rderer's action 
plan is not at all furthered by the use of th (~ organs, and there is no prima 
fiu.:ie consideration aga in , and the problematic case of the violi ni st. 
The second compari son case was that of an ti -abortion advocates 
using pictures of aborted fetuses. For the pictures to ex ist a prior abortion 
had to have occurred. However, thi s fa il s as an analogy now that we see 
what the most serious problem with profiting from the proceeds of an evil 
is. For clearly the use of the pictures does not further any action plan that 
the abortionist has, but on the contrary is meant to counter the action plans 
coming from the general maxim that the abortionist was acting on. Thus, 
there may even be argued to be <l primafilcie presumption in favor of sueh 
use if itjrul'tralEl' the illicit goals of the abortioni st. (Of course I leave 
aside the question whether the use of such pictu res is prudent and helpful.) 
Therefore, nOi every positive reason suffices to jusrify research on 
cell-lines derived from abortions. One needs a IJlVpol"liol/{itely mUl/g 
reason. In the case of vaccine production. this strong reason is almost 
surely present-as~uming one is doing the best one can to fi nd alternatives 
to the use of the illicitly derived cell lines. In the case of research, thi s has 
to be analyzed on a case by case basis. If the research is one of how to cure 
a mild form of acne and the research is extremely unlikely to yield a cure. 
it seems wrong-apart, of course. from the general wrongness of wasti ng 
research resou rces. If. however, the rescaroch is very likely to yield a cure 
for a fata l foml of cancer. then it seems acc·eptab le. 
I have no idea what to say about the in-between cases, nor how to 
draw the line. In general. there are no mathc~matica l fomlU lae for weighing 
costs and benefi ts, for weigh ing d ifferent kinds of considerations, though 
sueh fomlUlae do ex ist in specific cases (for instance, if the cost is the 
doing of an intrinsicall y wrong action, the cost is al ways too high). But 
nonetheless I think th<l t when one does something that has a presumption 




aga inst il. that is prill/a fac ie bad. one has usually reason 10 fee l a cenain 
di scomfon . This di scomfon is a recognition of the fact that something 
objecti vely bad comes from one's action, even though one is not intending 
it to do so. 
For instance. whi le the researcher is. I shall assume. not intending to 
promote the action plan of the malefactor qua actio" pIa" of the 
lIIale/aetor. such promotion is a side-effect of hi s work: the evildoer is in 
fact being rewarded. though such rewarding qua rewarding is not the 
researcher's intention. For, intuitive ly, it rewards someone to causally 
promote hi s action-plan--even if the person rewarded does not know about 
th is. This is. quite possibly. another area for the Principle of Double Effect. 
The good effect is the benefit s of the research: the bad effect is the 
unintended rewarding of ev il. 
Wheneve r Double Effect is in play. one can on ly act for 1.1 sujJiciellfly 
sTrollg reason. Hence. the radi cally pennissive view is wrong. just as the 
radi call y restri ctive view is. 
5. Objections 
(i) £tfmClio/l of cells ill fet uses 1I0r aborted for research purposes is 
/lot wrong. One might argue that the requirement of consent for organ 
donation is not morall y required. though it is politicall y prudent in an 
individualistic society. Our soc iety's di staste fo r non-consensual organ 
transplants should not deceive us into thinking that such transplants are 
actuall y wrong. 
If this objection succeeds. then my argument in SecLi on 2 for the 
wrongness of the extraction of fetal cell s fails . Note that such extracti on 
need not constitute either formal or material cooperation with the abortion 
after the fact if the extraction was not one of the reasons for which the 
abonion was done . Therefore. the rest of my argument would seem 10 be 
inapplicable. and revisions of accepted current Catholic medi cal eth ics 
standards would be call ed for. Nonetheless . my general analysis of 
cooperation after the fact would. J think. have plausibility, even if it lacked 
application to the case at hand . 
Two responses are possible. The first is that while such extraction 
lIeed lIot constitute cooperation. in practice it often does. The researcher 
has some kind of a fonnal arrangement with the abortioni st and it is 
unlikel y that thi s arrangement is such as to communicate to the aborti onist 
anyth ing other than approval of the abonion. 
Second ly. we should not be undul y skeptical of our moral intuitions 
about non-consensual use of other people 's organs. A human body after 
death is still something that call s for a respect akin to that which a li ving 
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body receives, albei ( ex pressed di fferentl y. Even a corpse should not be 
treated as a mere thing. g iven its intimate connection with the li vi ng body 
of the person. Now, it is acceptable for a person to g ive himself to another 
bodily and it is act.:eptable fo r the other to rece ive that gift. e.g .. on 
personalist grou nds that say that the nature of a human person is to be a 
g ifl. But it is arguably not acceptable for a person to simpl y rake (///(/ IIxe 
another person. And a similar ki nd of respect is call ed for fo r the body of 
the person even afte r death : it is not a thing to be mere ly taken and used, 
though it may be received as a gift. 
(ii) This al1alysis implies rl/(1/ ir doex Iwt mailer wherher the cells 
cllrrelltly Ilsed for research (Ire ol1 lOlogically removed from the original 
ails. On this anal ysis. all that matters. it seems, is the "distance" measured 
relati ve lo the original malefactor's intentions . Yet when people who were 
originally opposed to such research find out that a geneti c modification 
took place along the ce ll - line. their opposition tends to weaken. Thus. my 
analysis. it seems. does not correctly capture the moral issues involved. 
At least four responses are possible. The lirst is si mpl y for me to dig 
in my heels. The o illological modilicati on indeed does not affect things. 
We may feel it does because usually significant changes in the things 
produced from evi l also di stance the effects from the intenti ons of the 
orig inal malefactor. However, in this case. this is onl y an illusion. akin to 
that whereby a physically smaller item may seem to be further away. since 
the origi nal malefactor's intentions included this transformation . 
Secondly. one mi ght argue that the g reater the number of steps 
leadin g to a g iven poi m in a malefactor's plan of action, with only the first 
step in the plan be ing intrinsicall y wrong. the lesser the presumpt ion 
against cooperation at thm point. Thi s, however, seems implausible. For 
on the account I have g iven, it is the distance vis-a-v is the male facto r' s 
intentions that matte rs. And the malefactor may just as much intend things 
many steps away as things closer to himself. Indeed. surely, the malefacto r 
intends the end. whi ch is many ste ps removed. just as much as he intends 
the means. 
Thirdl y. and perhaps most sat isfyingly. one mi ght no te that there are 
multipl e moral dimensions along whi ch an action ca n be measured. Thus 
when IHe to someone that an unsound bridge is sound . I do wrong both by 
lying and by po temiall y causi ng physical harm. It may be that the noti on 
of ownership of one's body and of the genetic descendants of that body is 
not complete/y tl awed . While thi s is not ownership simplicirer. there may 
be something sufficiellll y ana logous to ownership to produce cennin 
presumptions against use of the desce ndant materi al without the person's 
permission. 
Thi s may even be connected in some way to the ri ghts of parellls 
with respect to children. If so. then genetic modification weakens the link 
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to the original person. and hence weakens the presumptions. Note that this 
wou ld al so strengthen the response to (i). by giving anOlher dimension to 
the badness of the original derivation. namely the dimension of something 
analogous to theft. 
However. to work ou t the detai ls here is a difficult. and perhaps 
impossible. task. Suppose that details cannot be worked out and in the end 
there is no analogy between one's relati onship to one 's ge net ic descendant 
material and one's relationship to one's property. Nonetheless. there 
clearly is at least the appearallce o f an analogy. and this appearance wou ld 
be enough to explai n our intuition that genetic modificat ion decreases 
wrongness. though without justifying thi s intuition. Our moral fee lings 
can. after all. go wrong. 
6. Applications 
Are there any practical consequence of th is view? There may well 
be. I do nOl have a story aboul how one weighs the benetits of a given 
research project over and agai nst the prima facie badness of cooperating 
mate rially with a past ev il. The decision probably needs to be made on a 
case~by+case basis by an Aristotelian pli rol1imos. At the same time. it is 
essential that the pltrrmimos when making the decision should be infonned 
by the correct theory of why the cooperation is prima facie bad and 
precisely what is bad about such cooperation . The account given will 
contribute to such a moral education of the agent. 
Moreover. because there is something prima facie bad about such 
cooperation. there is thereby positive reason to pursue methods. whether of 
producing of vacci nes or of doing research. that avoid such cooperation. It 
might be poss ible. for instance. to seek sympathe tic private donors for such 
purposes, and lhi s is the SO[1 of thing that research institutions have a 
reason to pursue . 
Finally. because the deci sion needs to be made on a case+by-case 
basis. an argument cou ld be made that strong infonned consent doctrines 
require that persons receiving any treatment that involves such 
coopermi on. or proxies of these persons. be informed of the eth ical issues 
involved. 
This may mean that parents Illay need 10 be infonned about the 
ethical issues in the case of vaccinations. which curren tly they apparen tl y 
are nol. Given the lac k of an objective rule for we ighing the issue. 
espec iall y in the case of vacci nations for di seases that are generall y 
unlikely to be life+lhrcatening. it might be necessary fo r the indiv idual 
paren! to make the dec ision. Of course one mighl think . on paternali sti c 
grou nds. that pub lic hea lth considerations override the need for informed 
consent. and so it is suffi cient for the medical personnel to make the 
decision. 
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Weakening informed conse nt requirements in favor of public hea lth 
le~tds 10 a dangerous slippery slope. however. and so probably should onl y 
be done when absolutely necessary.~ 
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